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A Robinsonian Approach to Discrimination* 
Wage discrimination might simply come about when firms offer lower wages to 
applicants whom they expect to accept comparatively low wage offers. This is 
the issue upon which the present paper tries to shed light. 
The approach adopted here might supplement other contributions, notably 
by Becker and Arrow'. Becker's pioneering work explains discrimination by a 
taste for discrimination: Employers or employees of group 1 dislike working 
together with members of group2. This induces discrimination. The problem 
with this approach is, however, that there cannot be discrimination in the long 
run since firms which employ a larger fraction of the cheaper workers will earn 
higher profits and will drive out other firms2. Thus, discrimination will disap- 
pear eventually. 
Another possibility is that discrimination arises because race or sex are used 
as indicators for productivity3. Hence these indicators will be coupled with 
different wages. In order to explain persistent discrimination one has to assume, 
however, a feedback by which higher wages induce higher productivity, thereby 
making the use of these indicators competitively dominant4. The additional 
problem with this approach seems to be, however, that there are often better 
indicators for productivity which are readily available or can be made available 
by employees in order to avoid discrimination: The particular certificate of a 
certain educational institution and previous employment records provide better 
indicators for productivity and qualification than race or sex; and the social 
* An earlier draft of this paper has been presented at the 1981 Econometric Society 
European Meeting in Amsterdam under the title "A Search-Theoretic Approach to 
Discrimination". I thank P. Rice and an unnamed referee for some critical comments. The 
paper is dedicated to Emmi. 
For a survey of the literature, see MARSHALL [1974]. 
See BECKER [1971], p. 56; ARROW [1972a], pp.90-96; THUROW [1975], pp. 160. 
' See ARROW [1972a], pp.96-98, [1972b], pp. 199-203, [1972c], section 4; DOERIN- 
GER and PIORE [1971], p. 139; PHELPS [1972]. 
See MARSHALL [1974], p.855. Akerlof's analysis of the origins of social custom 
circumvents this problem by introducing the assumption that products cannot be trated 
anonymously (AKERLOF [1976], pp. 606-616). Hence his solution of the problem will not 
apply in the present context. 
background and working attitudes can better be forecasted by information 
concerning the occupation, social status, and neighborhood of the parents than 
by race. For this reason, it seems to me, the "indicator" approach has its 
particular shortcomings, too, if indicators are thought to refer to productivity: 
The typical "social" indicators like race or sex will usually not be the best. 
Furthermore the approach presupposes productivity differentials in a statistical 
sense and will not be applicable in cases where the expected productivities of the 
two groups are identical. 
It might however be that the "social" indicators are linked to different supply 
attitudes. If women are, for instance, more closely tied to their homes than men, 
they will respond differently to wage oflers, and this might lead to discrimina- 
tion. The approach has been introduced in the thirties by the monopolistic 
competition theorists, most notably by Joan Robinson5. In the more recent 
discrimination literature it has been somewhat neglected6. 
The argument runs as follows: Assume two groups of workers who are 
equally qualified and are hence perfect substitutes in production. Denote the 
wage rate paid to group 1 workers by v and denote the wage rate paid to 
group2 workers by w ;  denote furthermore the supply elasticities of the two 
groups by ~ ( v )  and q ( w ) ,  respectively. The additional expenditure for one 
additional unit of type 1 workers is v (1 + l / ~ ( v ) )  and the marginal expenditure 
for type2 workers is w (1  + l / q ( w ) ) .  A necessary condition for a profit maxi- 
mum is now that these marginal expenditures are equated to the marginal 
product m: 
This implies that the wage differential vlw is related to the supply elasticities 
Loosely speaking, one might say that the group with a higher elasticity will 
receive a higher wage in equilibrium. It might be argued that this will also hold 
true in the long run when all pure profits are competed away and the "tangency 
solution" obtains7. Hence this type of theory will not run into the long-run 
difliculties of the other approaches. There is, however, a hitch in the argument 
since it is reasonable to assume that supply elasticities, although very small in 
the short run, will become very large in the long run. Hence discrimination will 
vanish. I 
The argument developed in this paper will yield formulas similar to those 
given above, but with a different interpietation which avoids this hitch. It rests 
' RoerNsoN [1969], pp. 228,302-304. 
The survey article by MARSHALL [1974], e.g., does not mention it. See MADDEN 
[I9771 for one of the few recent approaches in this tradition. 
' CHAMBERLIN 119621, pp. 81-100. 
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on the assumption that the probability of finding a new worker within one 
period is an increasing function of the wage offer. Hence the firms will choose a 
wage offer which is neither so high as to induce unnecessarily high labor costs 
nor so low that they have to wait very long in ordcr to find a candidate at all. I f  
the two groups respond differently in their supply probabilities to wage 
changes, this will induce discriminatione. 
The argument is developed in part 1 of the paper in a single-firm short-run 
framework, and will be generalized in part 2 to include some effects of competi- 
tion and changes of aspiration levels. 
Part I .  Short-Run Analysis 
2. The Problem 
Consider a firm which intends to fill a vacancy. There are two types of 
applicants who can perform the job equally well: They are perfect substitutes in 
production. 
They differ, however, in the probability of applying for the job opening and of 
accepting it. The firm is able to distinguish the members of the two groups 
directly and to offer different wages according to group affiliation. The problem 
is to describe an optimal wage-setting behavior of the firm. 
More specifically, let m denote the marginal product of the job under 
consideration. Let v denote the wage rate offered to applicants of group 1 and 
denote by w the wage offer to applicants of group 2. The probability of finding 
a suitable applicant of group 1 within one time period at the wage oiTer v is 
denoted by p and is called the access probability of group 1. Similarly, the 
access probability of group2 is denoted by q and gives the probability of 
finding a suitable applicant of group2 at the wage offer w within one time 
period. 
Starting with these notions, we can write down the probability of not finding 
an applicant of group 1 within one time period as ( 1  -p) .  Similarly, the 
probability of not finding an applicant of group2 within one time period is 
( 1  -9) .  Hence the probability of finding neither a candidate of type 1 nor a 
candidate of type2 within one period of time is ( 1 - p ) ( l - q ) .  The joint 
probability of not finding any worker within t periods of time can be written as 
( (1  - p ) ( l  - q ) f .  From this it follows that the probability of finding a suitable 
applicant within t periods of time is just (1 - ( 1  -p) ' ( l  - 9)'). 
It is agreed that the wage offered to an applicant initially is to be paid 
permanently and that search is stopped after the vacancy has been filled. Hence 
the expected remuneration to be paid to the job is ( p  . v + q . w)/(p + q). 
The similarity between search theory and the theory of monopolistic competition has 
been noted repeatedly, e.g. by PHELPS and WINTER [1970], p. 323. 
If  the firm is risk neutral and has a discount rate of r, the expected 
discounted value of the job is given by the discounted sum of the expected 
returns (m - ( p  - v + q . w ) / ( ~  + q ) )  weighted with the probabilities of having filled 
the job at time t, which is ( 1  - ( 1  - p ) ' ( l -  9)'): 
f An evaluation of the geometrical series leads to 
3. Switching to Continuous Time: Informal Argument 
In order to simplify the analysis it seems appropriate to take the trouble of 
casting the analysis into continuous time instead of using formulae (2) and (3) as 
the starting point of th'e further analysisg. 
If the time intervals are taken to be very small, the access probabilities for 
these intervals can be made very small, too. Hence the terms involving the 
product of access probabilities pa q will become negligible in (3).  Disregarding 
the constant factor ( 1  +r) /r ,  the maximand turns into 
For short time intervals - and hence small discount factors r - the factor 
( 1  + r)/r can be approximated by l lr .  Hence the value of an additional job will 
be just M/r.  
The exact limiting process is described in the next section and can be omitted 
at the readers discretion. 
4. Switching to Continuous Time: Formal Analysis 
If a time unit is subdivided into n intervals of equal length l ln, the access 
probability for group one will be pln, and that for group2 will be qln. The 
marginal product during an interval will be m/n and wages will be v/n and 
win, respectively. The discount factor applicable to an interval will be r/n. The 
expected discounted value of the job to t h ~  firm will be the discounted sum of 
interval returns weighted with the appropriate probabilities. This turns E from 
(2) into 
Alternatively - and equivalently - the accession process could have been envisaged as 
a Poisson process from the beginning - but this more elegant approach has not been used 
since it seems to lbp less intelligible than the more clumsy formulation adopted here. 
Taking the limit n-rm. yields1° 
By performing the integration, the following expression is obtained1': 
If this expression is to be maximized for a given r, this is equivalent to the 
maximization of the expression M given in the last section, formula (4). In the 
following we will start from there1'. 
5. Assumptions About Access Probabilities 
Returning to the more economic aspects of the problem, it will be assumed that 
the access probability p of group 1 is an increasing function of the wage offer v 
made to members of this group. Likewise, the access probability q of group 2 is 
assumed to be an increasing function of the wage offer w. The general shape of 
these functions is depicted in Figure 1 for the access probability of group 1: 
There is a certain minimum wage offer, q, below which supply will be zero. If 
v increases beyond q, access probability will increase first progressively up to 
v = v, and degressively for a further increase in v. For v- r  a ,  p (v) approaches 
an upper limit j I 1 which captures the absolute scarcity of type 1 workers. The 
shape of the access probability function q (w) for group 2 workers is assumed to 
be qualitatively similar although it will differ, in general, from p(v). 
l o  By using 
n-m 
and the fact lim f ( x )  . g ( x )  = limf ( x )  . lim g (x) together with the relation 
m 1 "  f (s) ds = lim - / ( i /n)  
o n 
derived from the definition of the integral. 
m 
l 1  By using e-sr dr = 11s. 
0  
l 2  To be precise, the period rate of interest r in (2) is to be replaced by the associated 
continuous rate log(1 +r).  The rate of interest in (7) is to be understood in this sense. 
Fig. I Access probability p of group 1 as a function of the wage offer v 
These assumptions are formalized algebraically as follows13: 
with p(u)=O for OSvIp ,  for some g>0; p(v)>O for v>p; 
sign p' (0) = sign p (v); p" (v) 2 0 for 0 5 v I vO, for some vo E [Q, a); 
p" (v) < 0 for v > v,; limp ( v )  = p, for some p E (0, 11; 
ut=J 
with q(w)=O for O l w l w ,  for some y>O; q(w)>O for w > y ;  
sign q' ( w )  =sign q (w); q" (w) 2 0 for 0 I w I w,, for some w, E [y, m); 
q" (w) < 0 for w > w,; lim q (w) = ij, for some ij E (0, 11. 
wT=J 
From these access probability functions, the associated access elasticities can 
be defined. These elasticities, denoted by E and q, respectively, measure the 
relative increase 'n access probability in response to a one percent increase in 
the wage offer. kence they are independent of the choice of units. (They remain 
unaffected, for instance, by the slicing of time intervals discussed in section 3 
above.) 
l 3  A convenient and rather flexible family of functions is given by 
for a, c>O, b > 1. Another family is described by 
(**I p(o)  = p . exp { - (a(v- Q ) ) - ~ )  . 
Figure 1 has been selected from (*) by choosing a=0.5, b= 10, c= 10, y =2, ji =0.75. 
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These elasticities can be read off from the probability functions as indicated 
n Figure 2. 
Fig .  2 The access elasticity at v equals v/(v-u') 
Note that e(p)= co and &(co)=O14. Similarly, q  (w)=  oo and q(co)=O hold 
true. 
If the access probability function is sufficiently smooth, the associated 
elasticity will be strictly decreasing. 
where pn denotes the lowest non-vanishing derivative which is positive in order to 
guarantee p(v )  > 0 for v > p. Hence the limit is a. 
On the other hand, define P ( v )  : = p ( v )  - p' (0 ) .  v. 
The tangency equation at v is now given by y = P (0) +p' (v) . x. 
For V + C O ,  the tangency approaches the asymptote y = j .  Hence limP(v)=j. From 
vt m 
this it follows that 
P' ( 4  . v 
E ( C O )  := lim -= lim 1 p ( V ) - P ( v )  = - lim ( p ( o )  - P ( v ) )  = 0 
vtm ~ ( v )  "!a, P ( V )  j vTm 
This will be assumed in the following1': 
(12)  E' (u)  < 0  for all v  > p ;  E ( p )  = co, ~ ( o o )  = 0  
(13)  q'(w) < 0  for all w  > w ;  q ( y )  = co, q ( c o )  = 0  . 
Asshmptions (12) and (13)  can be viewed as imposing a law of decreasing 
returns on expected pay: Expected pay in one period for a group 1  worker is 
p .  v. The percentage response of expected pay to a one percent increase in the 
wage offer is E + 1. Assumption (12)  states that this response is decreasing wiih 
increasing wage offers. Similarly, assumption (13)  states that the response of 
expected pay to a group 2  worker is decreasing in the same sense. 
6. Short-Run Equilibrium Conditions 
The typical firm will try to maximize the present value of the job under 
consideration by choosing a suitable wage offer (v,  w), thereby taking into 
account that the access probability of each group will be affected by the offer 
made to that group. In other words: (8) and (9) are inserted into (4),  and this 
expression is maximized with respect to v  and w :  
(14)  M ( o ,  w ; m )  = m ( ~ ( v ) + q ( w ) ) - p ( v ) . v - q ( w ) . w  = max! . 
r + ~ ( v )  + q ( w )  v , w > o  
l 5  This is not a restriction on its steepness but simply a restriction on its general shape 
as can be seen from the fact that the functions (*) and (**) mentioned in note 13 above 
fulfill this requirement for all admissible parameter values and in particular for arbitrarily 
high values of the steepness parameter b. 
Assumptions (12), (13)  are made mainly in order to enhance the ease of exposition. For 
all results of the paper, the following far less restrictive, but less intuitive, assumptions on 
the elasticities of the partial derivatives would be sufficient: 
Note that conditions (12'). (13') are always fulfilled, for p" ( v )  < 0, q" (w)<O. Since 
E ( p )  = co and q ( y )  = CO,  E' < 0 and q' < 0 must hold true close to p and w, respectively. 
On the other hand, 
E' < 0 implies $ < s - . and hence (12') 
P ' 
q"w q' < 0 implies --r < q - 1 and hence (13') . 
4 
Therefore, (12') and (13') will always be satisfied close to p and y ,  respectively: 
Conditions (12') and (13') put restrictions only on the convex part of the probability 
functions. 
Since M-r-oo for v+oo or w-co, there exists a maximum of MI6. 
Denote this maximum by M*. Since M (0,O; m) =0, it is nonnegative: 
M* := max M(v,w;m)ZO . 
v .  w 
We will be interested only in solutions which yield positive access probabili- 
ties for each group. (If both access probabilities were zero, there would be no 
unemployment, and hence no discrimination; if one access probability were 
positive and the other zero, there would be segregation but not discrimination.) 
Hence we are interested only in cases where the necessary conditions for an 
inner maximum are fulfilled: 
Since the elasticities are, according to (12), (13), decreasing functions, the left- 
hand sides are strictly increasing in v and w, respectively. Hence the maximum 
will be unique". 
Conditions (16) and (17) imply 
This expression is algebraically identical to the monopolistic competition 
formula (I), although the interpretation of the elasticities is different. Guided by 
this analogy, one might say that the group with a more elastic supply will get a 
higher wage rate. This is not quite correct since the elasticities themselves are 
determined by the wage offers. The conjecture, however, leads to the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1: Assume v, w to be an equilibrium. If 12(v)> q (v) or 
12 (w)> q (w) or both, this implies v> w. In other words, if both groups were 
made the same wage offer v or w and one group had a higher elasticity at this 
offer, it would get the higher wage in equilibrium. 
Proof: 1. Assume 12 (0) > q (0). This implies 
V (1 + I/& (0)) < V (1 + 1/q (0)) . 
According to (16) and (17), equilibrium requires 
v (1 + I/& (v)) = W (1 + 1/q (w)) . 
Since M <(m- (pv+qw) / (p+q ) )  and since p + j  for v+oo and q+q  for w-rco, 
the bracket tends to minus infinity if either v+co or w-rcr, or both. Note that M is 
continuous and well defined for all nonnegative (v, w). 
l 7  1.e. if there exists an inner maximum, it will be a unique maximum. Since the 
existence of a maximum has been established, it is not necessary to look at the second- 
order conditions which happen to be ( IT) ,  (13') and are implied by (12), (13). 
Since (13) says thati q is strictly decreasing, the right-hand side is strictly 
increasing in w. Hence v> w follows. 
2. Assume c (w) > q (w). This implies 
Since (12) says that 12 is strictly decreasing, the equilibrium condition 
v (1  + l/c(v))= w (1 + l/q (w)) can only hold true for v > w. This proves the 
proposition. 
Proposition 1 implies that 12 (v) > q (w) for all identical wage offers v = w will 
lead to discrimination of group 2, i.e. to v > w. 
7. Some Applications of the Short-Run Equilibrium Conditions 
Proposition 1 might shed light on some issues: 
I .  Social determinants of discrimination. Take for instance the case that the 
two groups have different work attitudes for exogenous social reasons. It might 
be that women respond less to changes in wage offers since they place more 
weight on work attributes like proximity and comfortable working hours in 
order to meet their customary duties as housewives, whereas men tie their self- 
esteem more to remuneration and are more mobile. Under these conditions the 
access elasticity of males would be higher than that of women if both groups 
were offered identical wages. According to proposition 1 this would lead to a 
lower pay for women. Firms would pay less to women than to males since they 
knew that they would get them for lower pay, and their willingness to accept an 
offer would not increase sufficiently if the wage offer were increased. Hence it 
would not be worth while for the firm to offer higher wages. 
2. Restricted opportunities and discrimination. The access elasticities, as faced 
by the typical firm, will be affected by the scope of employment and wage 
opportunities open to the two groups: If there is a lack of alternatives for 
members of one group, this will restrict their access elasticity. If the alternatives 
are very unattractive with regard to remuneration, i.e. if discrimination prevails 
in the rest of the economy, this will have the same effect of reducing access 
elasticities, but only in the short run. (We shall see Jater that this kind of 
discrimination will be eliminated in the long run.) 
3. Minority status and discrimination. If we consider two groups of identical 
behavior, where group 2 is a minority comprising only a (positive) fraction 
p< 1 of the number of group 1 workers: this will not lead to discrimination: 
Since both groups behave identically, we have q (w) = p - p  (v) for all identical 
wage offers w = v. This implies that e (v) = q (w) for all v = w 'and hence that the 
equilibrium condition v (1 + 1/12 (0)) = w (1 + l/q (w)) can only be achieved 
without discrimination, i.e. at v =  w. (Remember that w (1 + l/q (w)) is strictly 
increasing due to (13).) 
Part 2: Long-Run Analysis 
8. Determinants of Access Probabilities 
The access probability functions as introduced in section 5 above are faced by 
the representative firm ceteris paribus. The ceteris paribus clause entails, in 
particular, that other firms do not change their wage offers and their labor 
demand. In order to study the properties of market equilibrium, these deter- 
minants have to be given explicit consideration now. 
We write the access probability p of group 1, then, as 
(19) P = 1 .f (da) a>O, AE(O,I) . 
The function f is assumed to have the same qualitative properties as the 
access probability function p(v) described in (8)''. The function p(v) can be 
viewed as being generated by (19) for fixed values of the parameters a and A. 
The parameter a represents the aspiration level of group I workers: The higher it 
is, the higher has to be the wage offer to group 1 workers in order to induce a 
given access probability. The aspiration level will be viewed as being deter- 
mined by the general wage level for group 1 workers prevailing in the economy. 
The parameter A represents the scarcity of group 1 workers: It is the scarcity 
parameter for group I. The larger the demand for group 1 workers, the smaller 
will be the share of type 1 applicants to the representative firm. This can be 
described by a low value of Ai9.  
Similarly, we consider the access probability q of group2 as being deter- 
mined not only by the wage offer w but also by the aspiration level /3 for 
group 2 workers and of the scarcity parameter p of group 2: 
(20) 4 = P ' g(wlB) B'O, ~ ~ ( 0 , l )  . 
Again, the ceteris paribus access probability function q (w) can be viewed as 
being generated by (20) for given parameter values P and p Hence g( . )  
satisfies the qualitative properties postulated for q(.)*O. 
The access elasticities associated with (19) and (20) turn out to be indepen- 
dent of the scarcity parameters A and p. Call them E' and tj. Because of (12) 
and (13), they are strictly decreasing in the relevant region: 
ls 1.e. take one function p ( . )  satisfying (8), (12), and g <  1 and call it f  (.). 
l 9  The more general formulation of (19) as p = f ( o ;  a, A )  would complicate the analysis 
unduly. More specific alternatives like p = A . / ( o - a )  would not affect the qualitative 
results. There are good psychological reasons, however, to assume that the ratio v/a is 
relevant since there exists no absolute standard of the wage level. 
'O 1.e. take one function q (.) satisfying (9), (1 3), w < 1 and call it g (.). 
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Of paricular interesfare the elasticities at wage offers which are equal to the 
aspiration level, i.e. at v/a = w/p = 1. Denote these by I and t j  and call them the 
long-run access elasticities: 
Equipped with these notions and definitions we can now proceed to discuss 
some longer-run issues. 
9. Long-Run Equilibrium Conditions 
,'-- We start from short-run equilibrium. The firm realizes the maximum present 
value M*/r of the job by choosing suitable wage offers. Assume now that 
the capital needed to create an additional job opening is K. If the difference 
M*/r - K is positive, the firm will create additional jobs, and other firms will, 
typically, do the same. Hence the scarcity parameters I and p in (19) and (20) 
will decrease, shifting the short-run access probability functions p(v) and q (w) 
downward. This will decrease M for all offers (v, w), as can be seen immediately 
from (14). Hence M* will decrease2'. 
Conversely, if the value of a job is less than the capital outlays required to 
establish it, i.e. if ~ * / r - K  is negative, this will lead to depreciation and to a 
reduction in the number of jobs. In this way, an equilibrium will be achieved 
which satisfiesZZ 
This turns conditions (16) and (17) into the analogues of the conventional 
monopolistic competifion conditions 
From these conditions, the impact of a change in aspiration levels can be 
deduced: 
Proposition 2: A one percent increase in the aspiration ievel will increase the 
corresponding wage by less than one percent. Algebraically 
\ 
2 1  In addition, the marginal product m in (14) might decrease since the expanded 
production might run into decreasing returns and decreasing product prices. This would 
reduce M* as well. 
21 Note that condition (25) will be satisfied whether or not pure profits have been 
competed away in the long-run, i.e. whether or not the "tangency solution" obtains. The 
argument applies also if the marginal product happens to change dlrring the process of 
adaption. 
z g s  
Proof: According tb (21), E increases with a. Hence v.(1+ 113 is decreasing 
in a. On the other hand, this term is decreasing in u. If (26) is to be maintained, 
this requires dojda > 0. On the other hand, u(1 + 1j.E) is homogenous of degrcc 
one in o and a. This implies that a proportionate increase in v and a would 
increase the expression. In order to keep it constant, v should increase less than 
proportionally. The second part of the proposition is proved analogously. 
In the longer run, the aspiration levels will move in the direction of actual 
experience, i.e. actual pay. The rationale for this is that aspiration levels tend to 
correspond to actual achievements of the relevant reference groupz3. In addi- 
tion, the individual firm's wage offer will be judged in the light of the prevailing 
market remuneration, i.e. actual pay. We can stipulate, therefore, an adaptive 
process which explains the relative change of aspiration levels by the relative 
difference between actual pay and the relevant aspiration level, 
Together with (26), (30) describes an adjustment process in the aspiration 
level of group 1 which tends to a long-run equilibrium value equal to actual pay 
for group 1. This can be seen as follows: If v > a, this will increase a according 
to (30). From (28) we know that this increase in a ,  increases v less than 
proportionally. Hence v/a will decline. This will coniinue until via= 1 and 
li =O. Conversely, v< a will reduce a and will increase vja until via= 1 is 
reached. So we can write down as a long-run equilibrium condition that the 
wage equals the aspiration level of group 1, 
The same argument holds true for group 2 24: 
These long-run equilibrium conditions can be inserted into (26) and (27). This 
amounts to substituting the access elasticities E' and tj by the long run access 
elasticities E and rj as defined in (23) and (24). Hence we get explicit formulae 
for the determination of long-run remuneration: 
See the references given in SCHLICHT [1981]. 
Note that the process remains stable, and leads to conditions (32) and (33) if the 
marginal product is - due to an optimal firm policy -an increasing function of the wage 
rates: This will render only the left-hand sides of the inequalities (28) and (29) invalid. 
The wage differential will simply be determined by the long' -run access 
elasticities (which are behavioral constants): 
This enables us to state directly the long-run analogue to proposition 1: 
Proposition 3: In the long run, the group with the higher long-run access 
elasticity will reck'ive the higher wage. 
10. Some Applications of the Long-Run Equilibrium Conditions 
1. Social determinants of discrimination. The argument put forward in the 
context of the short-run analysis (section 7.1) still applies in the long-run: If 
monetary incentives are more effective for one group than for the other, the 
favored group will get higher pay. In addition, we can evaluate numerically the 
resulting wage differential v/w: For instance, if males have a long-run access 
elasticity of E= 1 (i.e. if their access probability increased by one percent if 
remuneration were increased by one percent above the aspiration level) and if 
women have a lower long-run elasticity of, say, rj=0.5 for reasons mentioned 
before, this would induce a remuneration of women which is one-third below 
that of males, i. e. vlw = 312. Competition will not erode this differential. 
2. Consequences of equal-pay enforcement. If equal pay is enforced legally, 
expression (14) is to be maximized under the assumption that a common wage 
rate u is paid to both groups, i.e. v = w = u. This yields the necessary condition 
where the access elasticity e referring to both groups is defined as 
Using the long-run equilibrium conditions (25), (32); (33), condition (37) turns 
into 
where the long-run access elasticity Z is a weighted average of the long-run 
access elasticities E and 4 
The weight u denotes the fraction of type 1 workers in the work force of the 
typical firm. It is determined by the scarcity parameters 13, and p which emerge 
in the long run. If (39) is compared with (34) and (39, it can be seen that the 
nondiscriminating wage rate will lie in between the wage rates emerging under 
discrimination, i.e. 
Since the expression 1/(1+ l/x) is strictly concave in x, we get furthermore 
(42) u > a v + ( l - a ) w  for v $. w 
in long run equilibrium. This means that the average wage will increase from 
av + (1 -a) w to u if an anti-discrimination law is introduced". 
Furthermore, it can be seen from (4) that M  will decrease if either p or q is 
put to zero and v = w holds. Hence it will not be profitable for the firm to hire 
only one type of workers: An equal-pay law will not lead to job discrimination 
or segregation. 
3. Restricted opportunity and discrimination. Again, the group with re- 
stricted opportunities will supply with a lower long run elasticity and will suffer 
discrimination. Thus the short run argument put forward in section 7.2 above 
will remain valid. 
However, the argument that there will be discrimination within one firm 
because there is discrimination in the rest of the economy will not hold true in 
the long run: Assume that in the short run there has been discrimination, and 
aspiration levels have adapted to that, i.e. assume a > P. Assume in addition 
that both groups are identical in the sense that the functions f and g as 
introduced in (19) and (20) are identical. Because of propaition 2, therc will be 
discrimination in the short run, but the wage differential v/w will be smaller 
than the ratio of aspiration levels a / j .  Aspiration levels will adapt to the new 
situation. In the long run, discrimination will disappear according to (36), since 
E and ij, as defined by (21)-(24), are identical. 
4. Regional discrimination. As a slight modification of the model under 
consideration, one might consider the case of two identical firms, one situated in 
an industrial region and the other in an underdeveloped district. The workers of 
firm 1 - call them group 1 workers - have many employment alternatives. The 
workers of firm2 live in a scarcely populated region with only a few job 
opportunities within a reasonable distance. Hence group 2 workers will have a 
2 5  This proposition is derived under the assumption that the fraction of type 1 workers 
a is not changed by such a move in the long run, i.e. that the ratio Alp is not amected. If 
a actually decreases, this might cancel the effect or even overcompensate it. 
lower access elasticity than group 1 workers. Assume that q(w)=O for firm 1 
and p(v)=O for firm2, i.e. that each firm can draw applicants only from the 
relevant pool. The maximand (4) for firm 1 now becomes 
The maximand for firm 2 is 
The necessary conditions for a maximum arez6 
In the long run, we have to assume M :  = r .  K and M ;  =re K as the 
analogues to (25), and have to replace the elasticities E and q by their long run 
values E and ij to capture the adaption of aspiration levels. Hence formulae 
(34)-(36) remain valid and the workers in the industrialized region will receive a 
higher income than the workers in the less-developed region. Note that these 
differentials are not eroded by competition since M :  = M :  = r  . K is fulfilled: 
The lower wage prevailing in the less-developed region is assumed to have 
expanded the num6er of jobs and of firms, thereby increasing vacancies up to 
the point where the value of an additional job and of an additional firm is equal 
to the capital outlays necessary to create it2'. 
The argument wopld require, therefore, a labor market which is, in a sense, 
tighter in the less-'ndustrialized region than in the industrialized one. As it / 
stands, it cannot explain the often-observed presence of both unemployment 
and low wages in the less-industrialized region. Note, however, that marginal 
products might be affected by the scarcity in kinds of labor outside of our 
consideration, where the scarcity argument might apply. These scarce factors of 
production might induce differentials in the marginal products of the workers 
under consideration between the two regions. Thus we might be led to consider 
the impact of productivity differentials on remuneration in the context of 
regional discrimination. 
The issue transcends, however, the purely regional'context and will be 
discussed in the following section. 
l6 The second ordef conditions are satisfied. M :  denotes the maximum of M ,  
and M :  the maximum of M, ,  analogous to (15). 
l7 See the argument leading to (25) above. 
I I. Levelling und Boosting of Prod~rctivity Di~erentiuls 
Lcaving tllc context of discrimination propcr i t  might be askcd: What arc thc 
cffccts of productivity differentials between the workers of the two groups on 
relative remuneration? 
Thc question, although oftcn unconsidcrcd in the theory of discrimination 
(which deals by definition with differential trcatrnent of essentially identical 
subjects), might be a very important one if it turns out, for instance, that minor 
productivity differentials cause very large wage differentials. We will refer to this 
as boosting. Take the case that women are slightly less productive than men 
because of pregnancy, child rearing, and induced slightly higher adjustment and 
turnover costs on the side of the firms. Will this slight productivity differential 
be boosted into a very large wage differential between males and females? Or, 
vice versa, will levellir~g take place in that resulting wage differentials are smaller 
than productivity differentials? 
Assume, then, that the marginal product of a group 1 worker m, is larger 
than that of a group2 worker m,. The expected return of a job is now 
This can replace the expression (m -(pv + qw)/(p + q)) in formula (2), and this 
expression can be placed in front of'the summation. Hence the geometrical 
series remains unaffected and we get the maximand 
4 
which replaces (4). The short run equilibrium conditions now become 
If both groups behave alike, i.e. if &(u)=q (w) for all identical wage offers 
v = w, a higher margital pfoduct of group 1 will cause a higher wage rate for 
that group. It turns oyt, however, that the resulting wage differential v/w will be 
less than the ratio of fd, - M:)/(mz - M*)18. I f  the number of jobs is adjustcd 
optimally such that M* ==rK,\there can be levelling or boosting, depending on 
the shape of the access elasticity function. 
The long-run equilibrium conditions (25), (34), and (35) turn into 
The underlying argument remains the same. Hence, if both groups behavc 
alike, we have E = f  and there will be boosting in the long run: The long run 
wage differential will exceed the ratio of the marginal products: 
v m,- rK m 
-= -  > 1 for ~ n ,  > mZ 
w mZ -rK mz 
There might, additionally, be a strong "social" boosting effect if there is social 
interdependence between the groups and the long run elasticities are affected by 
wages paid to the members of the other group: If  women are slighly less 
productive and if a couple has to decide about who to earn money and who to 
rear the chifdren, this will favor men looking for employment, and thus induce 
thc expectation in males and females that men will take a job with a higher 
probability. This expectatibn might crystallize in social rBies which tie women 
more closely to the home than men, inducing a decrease in their access 
elasticity. This will increase the wage differential and reinforce the custom, 
increasing the wage differential even more, etc. We might call this a social 
boosting effect since it works through social channels, even if the family, as we 
know it, might have its ultimate cause in economic pressures. This question 
need not be decided here. 
12. Consequences ,/'equal-pay enforcement. Denote as in section 10.2, the 
ratio of type 1 workers in the work force by a. The necessary condition for 
maximum of (48) under the restriction v = w = u (where u denotes the non- 
discriminating wage rate) turns into 
instead of (52) and (53), where P denotes the common access elasticity and rfi  is 
average productivity: 
Hence, it tukns out that the nondiscriminating wage is in the long run exactly 
equal to the average wage paid under discriminationz9. . 
The question arises, however, whether equal-pay enforcement might lead to 
job discriminqtion or segregation in the sense that it will become profitable for 
the firm to employ only one type of workers. 
In order to decide this, the firm has to compare - for given aspiration levels 
and scarcity parameters - the maximum value of the job attainable by 
employing both groups at a uniform wage with the maximum value which can 
This is SO because the left-hand sides of (49), (50), which are identical functions in the 
case under discussion, are increasing more than proportionally in the wage orer. The qualification made in note25 above applies here, too. 
bc obtaincd by employing only the more productive type 1 workers. Hence thc 
anti-discrimination law will work, if the following expression is positive, and i t  
will lead to segregation (job discrimination) if it is negative 
x t o r  r From this it can be seen that both cases are possible: If the discount T. 
is suflicienty small, the expression will become negative for a productivity m ,  of 
group 1 which exceeds the average productivity ri i. Hence the firm will employ 
only type 1 workers in this case. On the other hand, if productivity differentials 
are small, In, will be close to 61. For a sufficiently high discount rate, the firm 
will employ members of both groups on equal terms3'. 
12. Concludir~g Remarks 
The reformulation of Joan Robinson's theory of discrimination in terms of 
search theory might supplement the existing approaches. It has less difficulties 
in explaining persistent discrimination, thereby reinforcing the argument of the 
other approaches: Discrimination might lead, through habit formation, to a 
taste for discrimination as well as to productivity differentials in the "indicator" 
sense. 
J 
E i w  Thcorie der Lolltldiskrin~inierurlg 
d la Joan RoOirlson 
Bei der Festsetzung des Lohnsatzes fur eine bestimmte Tatigkeit wird die 
Unternehmung den Lohnsatz weder unnotig hoch wahlen noch so  gering, daB 
es unwahrscheinlich wird, eine geeignete Arbeitskraft zu finden. So werden die 
Lohnsatze unter Berucksichtigung ihres Einflusses auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit 
einer erfolgreichen Stellenbesetzung optimal fixiert. 
Wenn Indikatoren wie Geschlecht oder Rasse typischerweise mit unter- 
schiedlichem Angebotsverhalten verknupft sind, wird die Lohnsetzung der 
Unternehmung zu Diskriminierung gemaB diesen Indikatoren fuhren. 
Der Ansatz kann als eine moderne Neuformulierung der Diskriminierungs- 
theorie von Joan Robinson verstanden werden. Er fiihrt zu mathematisch 
identischen Gleichgewichtsbedingungen, allerdings mit abweichender Inter- 
pretation und unter Vermeidung einiger Schwierigkeiten des urspriinglichen 
'O A more exact statement of the underlying mathematical conditions is beyond the 
scope ol the present paper. 
Ansatzes. lnnerhalb des entwickelten Rahmens IaBt sich die Moglichkcit lang- 
fristig anhaltender Biskriminierung aufweisen und so ein Beitrag zur Erkllrung 
eines Phlnomens leisten, das andere Ansatze (Joan Robinson's eingeschlos- 
sen) gewisse Schwierigkeiten bietet. 
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